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We propose a new three-dimensional approach to party newness and an interval index of 
party congruence/novelty. Building on that, we also propose a split-vote-by-congruence 
(SBC) approach to electoral volatility that employs the index. Four elections from 
different countries that exhibited different forms of party change are used to illustrate 
the approach. The congruence/novelty index corresponds to our qualitative case 
knowledge and the SBC approach leads to meaningful volatility scores. Ad hoc coding 
of parties as new/old or singular successors/predecessors can seriously over- or 
underestimate volatility that explains divergence among volatility scores in literature. 
By eliminating the need for dichotomous and often controversial coding decisions, the 
SBC approach allows for a substantially more reliable calculation of volatility.  
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How to assess party system change? The Pedersen index of electoral volatility 
(Pedersen, 1979, 1980) has become the de facto gold standard measure that is easy to 
calculate by simply adding up all vote gains or losses by individual political parties. In 
this article, we fully endorse the volatility index as the best available measure of party 
system change, despite some limitations (Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Powell and Tucker, 
2014; Rattinger, 1997; Sikk, 2005). However, we propose an enhanced approach to its 
calculation that accounts for the volatile nature of parties themselves and, in particular, 
the diversity among new parties. 
Prompted by electoral successes since the 1980s, a growing amount of literature has 
analysed new parties in Western and Eastern Europe, focussing mostly on the 
determinants of their emergence (Drummond, 2006; Hanley and Sikk, 2016; Harmel 
1985; Harmel and Robertson 1985; Lane and Ersson, 2007; Lucardie 2000; Mainwaring 
and Zoco, 2007; Powell and Tucker, 2014; Roberts and Wibbles, 1999; Sikk, 2012; 
Tavits, 2005, 2006, 2008a). Many such parties have been genuinely new,1 while others 
have resulted from reconfiguration and transformation of existing parties, particularly in 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).  
Correctly identifying new parties is essential for a meaningful calculation of volatility 
(emphasized by Barnea and Rahat, 2011; Powell and Tucker, 2014; see also Ersson, 
2012). However, this is difficult when parties do not fit the dichotomous classification 
as new or old. Examples of partially novel parties abound in CEE but they are also 
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found in long-standing democracies (see examples of Kadima and Danish People’s 
Party below). Furthermore, different degrees of novelty even occur in well-established 
and generally stable parties – contrast, for example, the election of Jeremy Corbyn as 
the leader of the British Labour Party in 2015 to much smaller changes over the 
preceding twenty years. Partial novelty is also embedded in splits and mergers, and the 
formation and collapse of electoral coalitions. As all four mix novelty and oldness, 
strictly linking them to a single successor or precursor can be difficult or misleading. 
However, classifying parties as either new or old and linking them to a singular 
predecessor or successor is the standard practice in current approaches to electoral 
volatility. In this article, we suggest a more nuanced method to account for partial 
novelty or significant discontinuity in ‘electons’ – to propose a common term for parties 
and other electoral units. ‘Electons’ stresses the conceptual distinction between political 
parties as organizations and electoral units. Also, electoral units come in a variety of 
forms – electoral coalitions are a commonplace in many (new) democracies, sometimes 
non-party organizations contest elections and some electoral ‘parties’ lack crucial 
features of political parties (e.g. members, proper organization, programmatic profile). 
The term ‘electon’ puts the emphasis on elections and avoids evoking other specific 
features of parties. Finally, it is a short and simple alternative for the term ‘parties and 




The electoral volatility index poses challenges in countries with high levels of electoral 
discontinuity (rise and disappearance of electons) or innovation (splits, mergers, 
electoral coalitions, see Ibenskas and Sikk, 2017; Marinova, 2015). First, some 
apparently new electons – e.g. with a new name – can be old parties rebranded. 
Secondly, electons with novel organization or personnel can have significant links to old 
ones, possibly even retaining a name. Finally, electons can split and merge – sometimes 
in complex combinations that makes pinning down a singular successor or predecessor 
difficult or even impossible.  
Therefore, classifying electons bluntly as new or old, and identifying a singular 
successor or predecessor can misconstrue party development. Partially novel electons 
are particularly common in CEE and often defy ‘correct’ dichotomous coding; yet, such 
coding decisions can result in very different volatility scores. Our proposed approach 
considers both the novelty of electons and their congruence (similarity) with previously 
existing electons.2 
We start by proposing a measure of electon congruence/novelty (congruence/novelty), 
inspired by the notions of multidimensional party newness (Barnea and Rahat, 2011; 
Litton, 2015). The measure incorporates three dimensions: (a) organization, including 
name, (b) leader and (c) candidates. Congruence refers to the degree of similarity 
between a pair of electons in consecutive elections. Novelty refers to the newness of an 
electon vis-à-vis a predecessor or all previous electons combined. The 
5 
 
congruence/novelty index is useful for various purposes: identifying new electons; 
measuring aggregate novelty in elections to reflect levels of party system change and 
continuity; or even measuring change in established parties, where periods of stability 
can be punctuated by bouts of change. Party change is obviously not limited to these 
dimensions; for example, programmatic change can occur independently of the other 
dimensions. However, it is not included here as (a) programmatic change is more 
difficult to measure and requires more in-depth information and (b) party competition 
(in CEE and elsewhere) is not always highly programmatic. 
We start by outlining specific criteria for the operationalization of congruence/novelty 
and testing the validity the index by looking at four elections exhibiting different kinds 
of electon innovation. The second half of the article proposes an enhanced split-vote-by-
congruence approach to electoral volatility using virtual electons based on 
congruence/novelty scores. We compare our approach to other commonly used 
approaches to volatility calculation and offer two illustrative examples.  
Degrees of congruence and novelty 
What constitutes a ‘new’ party has long preoccupied students of party politics (for 
overviews see e.g. Litton, 2015; Emanuele and Chiaramonte, 2016). Thereby, party 
newness has until now generally been conceptualized dichotomously with various 
criteria for distinguishing between ‘new’ and ‘old’ parties.3 There is still no universally 
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accepted definition of ‘new parties’ but different coding decisions can lead to big 
differences in volatility scores and, hence, assessments of party system stability. In their 
conceptually driven work, Barnea and Rahat (2011) emphasize the particular 
importance of the concept of party newness to the analysis of party system change. 
They develop a framework of eight criteria inspired by Key’s (1942) notion of parties as 
‘tripartite systems of interaction’ involving: (a) Party-in-the-electorate (label, ideology, 
voters), (b) Party-as-organization (formal status, institutions, activists), and (c) Party-in-
government (representatives, policies). Barnea and Rahat propose a threshold to 
distinguish between old and new parties and demonstrate their framework by analysing 
the borderline case of Israel’s Kadima party. In her study of party novelty and change in 
European Parliament elections, Litton (2015) also adopts a multidimensional approach 
to party newness. Analysing the degree of change within parties, she maps party novelty 
on two ordinal scales: (a) change in parties’ structural affiliation (mergers, splits, 
alliances) and (b) change in parties’ trademark attributes (name, leader and programme) 
(Litton, 2015: 714). Both studies make important advances in theoretical and empirical 
foundations of the study of party system and party change.  
However, further progress can be made on three fronts. First, strict thresholds of 
newness can be problematic in borderline cases – coding protocols can have a 
particularly big impact on volatility if the parties are very successful (such as Kadima 
discussed by Barnea and Rahat). Secondly, the requirement to identify a single 
successor/predecessor after splits and mergers leads to similar problems, particularly if 
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they involve highly successful but ad hoc electoral coalitions. Finally, we concur with 
Litton’s notion of gradual party change, but argue that it is desirable to move beyond a 
qualitative scale and propose an interval scale of electon novelty. 
The proposed index of aggregate electon congruence (the polar opposite of novelty) 
ranges from 0 (perfect incongruence) to 1 (perfect congruence) and is based on three 
dimensions: (a) organization including name, (b) leadership and (c) candidates.4 Hence, 
we follow Barnea and Rahat’s framework, reconfiguring some of their criteria and 
introducing a more systematic approach to candidate congruence/novelty. Furthermore, 
we apply the framework to a threefold differentiation of electon characteristics found in 
Litton’s two-dimensional conceptualisation of party change. Below, we identify broad 
benchmark conditions for congruence scores (see supplementary materials for 
additional detail), but the specific scores often need to consider the circumstances of a 
particular case (as illustrated by examples in the following section). 
Organization combines organizational structure and name. A genuinely old electon must 
retain both (organizational congruence = 1), while a genuinely new one must have no 
identifiable precursors in terms of organization and name (0). Between these two 
extremes are electons with minor changes to their name, electoral organization or both 
(0.75), those that experience more substantial changes (e.g. a merger of two similarly 




As we are interested in both parties and electoral coalitions, we consider both electoral 
and ‘extra-electoral’ organization and names. For example, a coalition of parties that 
have previously contested elections separately should be considered as partially new 
(congruence = 0.5). A new party emanating from an entrenched electoral coalition is 
also partially new, but less so (0.75). 
Leader. An electon with no leadership changes is perfectly self-congruent (congruence 
= 1). A new leader always brings a degree of novelty, particularly when elected in a 
competitive contest, for example after an electoral defeat. Congruence is lowest if the 
leader has no previous party political experience (0). It increases gradually if the new 
leader has held a low profile in its party (0.25), held a political office as an independent 
or a medium-ranking office in a party (0.5) or has previously been near the party’s 
leadership, leading a faction or holding a top political office for the party (0.75). 
Candidates. If all candidates of an electon contested previous elections with the same 
electon, it is perfectly self-congruent. If none of the candidates contested the previous 
election, the electon is perfectly novel. If the candidates come from several previous 
electons, the pairwise congruence depends on the share of candidates who previously 
ran on each list. For practical and substantive reasons, we suggest looking at the carry-
over among top-ranking candidates.6 This contrasts with earlier studies on candidate 
turnover that have tended to analyse full candidate lists (e.g. Kreuzer and Pettai, 2003; 
Shabad and Slomczynski, 2004). Very high levels of turnover are common among 
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candidates with no electoral prospects that have little importance for the substantive 
degree of continuity. Our case studies below also show that stability tends to be 
substantially higher amongst highly ranking candidates than among the tails of 
candidate lists. 
What constitutes the ‘top’ of a candidate list depends on electoral system. In closed list 
systems, list placements reflect the position of candidates in party hierarchy. Under 
open or semi-open lists, top candidates are identified by preference votes.
7
 As a 
threshold, we use the top 25% of candidates relative to assembly size or district 
magnitude. 
Congruence and novelty in changing party systems 
This section discusses key examples of different electon transformations to illustrate the 
congruence/novelty index, covering older and newer democracies and different electoral 
rules. We include four cases highlighting the most common and challenging issues in 
coding party novelty – a partially new party (Kadima, Israel 1996), a splinter (Danish 
People’s Party, 1998), a merger (Pro Patria and Res Publica Union, Estonia 2007) and 
an electoral coalition collapse (Poland 2001). We focus on interesting individual 
electons, but also compare their congruence scores to those of other major electons. 
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A partially new party: Kadima (Israel, 2006) 
Due to its unusual genesis, Kadima presents a true borderline case of electon novelty 
and could justifiably be classified as a new, old or a splinter party. Kadima was 
established by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon four months before the 2006 Knesset 
elections (see Table 1) and while it adopted a new name, it was in many ways a splinter 
from Likud (Sharon’s former party) as many former Likud members and functionaries 
defected to Kadima and populated its institutions. Hence, Kadima’s organizational 
novelty and congruence to Likud were both medium (0.5). 
Table 1 Israel 2003-6 (vote %) 
 2003 2006 
Kadima   22.0  
Labour-Meimad  14.5   15.1  
Shas  8.2   9.5  
Likud  29.4   9.0  
Yisrael Beitenu   9.0  
National Union/Yisrael Beitenu  5.5   
National Union/NRP   7.1  
Gil   5.9  
Meretz  5.2   3.8  
Shinui  12.3  0.2 
One Nation  2.8  merged w Labour 
Yisrael BaAliyah  2.2  merged w Likud 
Others 20.1  18.3  
Source: Diskin and Reuven, 2007. 
Ehud Olmert – Kadima’s leader at the time of elections – became party leader and 
Prime Minister after Sharon suffered a stroke before the election. Kadima’s leadership 
would have been perfectly congruent to Likud had Sharon led the party to elections, as 
he was Likud’s leader until setting up Kadima. However, as Olmert had served in major 
cabinet positions for Likud, Kadima’s leadership novelty and congruence to Likud were 
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medium (0.5). Congruence of Kadima’s top candidates with Likud was high (0.4) and 
only marginal with other parties (data: Knesset n.d.).8  
The aggregate congruence with Likud was 0.4 and with all established parties combined 
0.6, making Kadima a prototypical partially new party (novelty = 0.4). We concur with 
Barnea and Rahat (2011) that it is difficult to classify Kadima as a new electon or a 
splinter from Likud. However, the choice very strongly affects the volatility index for 
the election, resulting in either highest ever volatility in Israel or the lowest in four 
consecutive elections (Barnea and Rahat, 2011: 315). As shown below, the 
congruence/novelty index can provide a remedy against such (impossible) dichotomous 
choices in calculations of electoral volatility.  
A splinter: Danish People’s Party (1998) 
In 1995, Pia Kjærsgaard, the former leader of the Danish Progress Party (FP) left the 
party following a long-standing internal strife where she ended up on the losing side. 
She set up the Danish People’s Party (DF) that was joined by three other MPs and about 
one third of FP members (Pedersen 2006). DF entered the parliament after the 1998 
elections, siphoning away support from FP (see Table 2).  
The new party was perfectly congruent with FP in terms of its leader, but adopted an 
entirely novel name. A new organization was created and a membership drive followed, 
but Kjærsgaard remained dominant and former FP members constituted the core of the 
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new party (Pedersen, 2006). Hence, in terms of name and organization the DF in 1998 
can be considered partially congruent (0.5) with FP in 1994. Organizational congruence 
to the stump FP was perfect, as the party retained its name, bulk of its original 
membership, and organization. Leadership congruence can be set at 0.5 as the new 
leader Kirsten Jacobsen had been a leading figure of FP’s anti-Kjærsgaard flank. 
Table 2 Denmark 1994-8 (vote %) 
 1994 1998 
Social Democrats 34.6 35.9 
Liberals 23.3  24.0  
Conservatives 15.0 8.9  
Socialist People’s Party  7.3 7.6  
Danish People’s Party   7.4  
Progress Party  6.4 2.4  
Others 13.4 13.8  
Source: Nielsen, 1999. 
Candidate congruence of FP (1994) was higher with the stump FP than DF. 25% of all 
DF candidates in 1998 had previously run on FP’s list. Of FP’s candidates, 36% had run 
for the party in the previous election – not much fewer than in 1994 when 45% of 
candidates had carried over from the previous election.9 When looking at the most 
popular 25% of candidates in districts,10 the congruence was much higher for both DF 
(0.65) and FP (0.78). Hence, the DF candidate list was less congruent with FP’s list in 
1994 than that of the stump FP while the latter’s self-congruence was comparable to 
main Danish parties (Social Democrats 0.82 and Liberals 0.77). 
The aggregate congruence scores for DF and FP were similar (0.72 and 0.76, 
respectively), but congruence varied across dimensions, FP scoring highly on 
organization and name and DF on leadership. The aggregate novelty (0.28 and 0.24, 
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respectively) was the inverse of aggregate congruence as both were non-congruent with 
other 1994 electons. 
A merger: Pro Patria and Res Publica Union (Estonia, 2007) 
In 2003, Estonia saw the breakthrough of Res Publica (RP) – a genuinely new party in 
name, leader and candidates. Its leader, Juhan Parts became the Prime Minister after the 
election, but the party’s popular support quickly eroded and already in 2004 RP’s 
leadership was planning a merger with one of the centre-right parties. In April 2006, RP 
and Pro Patria (IL, an established conservative party) announced plans to merge.  
The merged party (IRL) was jointly led by the former leaders of its two constituent parts 
until May 2007. Hence, at the time of the March 2007 elections (see Table 3), it was 
halfway between an electoral coalition and a proper party.11 Both leadership and 
organizational congruence (to RP and IL) can be set high at 0.85 because of the 
transitory dual leadership arrangement and a name combining the names of its 
predecessors.  
In terms of candidates, IRL was highly congruent with both (congruence = 0.39) while 
23% of top candidates were electoral novices (candidate novelty 0.23).12 The aggregate 
congruence to both IL and RP was 0.7, while the overall novelty was 0.18 (0.15 for 
leaders, 0.15 for organization, 0.23 for candidates). Remarkably, in 2003, the 
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archetypical genuinely new RP had had very high candidate novelty (0.87). In contrast, 
in 2011 parliamentary elections, IRL had very high candidate self-congruence (0.74).  
Table 3 Estonia 2003-7 (vote %) 
 2003 2007 
Reform Party (RE) 17.7 27.8 
Centre Party (KE) 25.4 26.1 
Pro Patria and Res Publica Union (IRL)  17.9 
Res Publica (RP) 24.6  
Pro Patria (IL) 7.3  
Social Democratic Party (SDE) 7.0a 10.6 
Estonian Greens (EER)  7.1 
People’s Union (RL) 13.0 7.1 
Others and individual candidates 4.8 3.3 
a Moderates 
Source: Pettai, 2004, 2008. 
Electoral coalition collapse (Poland, 2001) 
The 2001 Sejm election brought a wholesale and complex transformation of the Polish 
political scene (Table 4).
13
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Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS), that had led the government following the 
successful 1997 election, but dropped out of the parliament altogether in 2001. Four 






Table 4 Poland 1997-2001 (vote %) 
Party 1997 2001 
Democratic Left Alliance-Labour Union (SLD-UP) 27.1 41.0 
Civic Platform (PO)  12.7 
Self-Defence of the Polish Republic (SO)  10.2 
Law and Justice (PiS)  9.5 
Polish Peasant Party (PSL) 7.3 9.0 
League of Polish Families (LPR) 
 
7.9 
Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) 33.8 5.6a 
Freedom Union (UW) 13.4 3.1 
Movement for Reconstruction of Poland (ROP) 5.6  
Others 12.8 1.0 
Notes: a Solidarity Electoral Action of the Right (AWSP). 
Source: Szczerbiak, 1998; Millard, 2003b. 
Civic Platform (PO), the biggest of the new electons,14 was established in January 2001 
by three prominent politicians: Andrzej Olechowski, Maciej Płażyński and Donald 
Tusk. Olechowski was runner-up in the 2000 presidential elections and had served in 
governments of different political hues in the early 1990s. Płażyński was Speaker of the 
Sejm for AWS since 1997 and led one of AWS’s constituent parties (Szczerbiak, 2002). 
Finally, Tusk was one of the leaders of Freedom Union (UW) who left the party in 2000. 
The party had three de facto leaders until after the election in September 2001; 
Płażyński was elected the official leader only later. 
In terms of leadership, PO was slightly congruent with both AWS and UW (both 0.25). 
Płażyński and Tusk had been very prominent members of AWS and UW, respectively. 
However, as neither had been the respective main leader and Olechowski was an 
independent, leadership novelty can be set relatively high at 0.5. Organizationally, PO 
was mildly congruent with AWS and UW as it inherited constituent parties or factions. 
However, as it adopted a completely new name, organizational congruence with each 
can be set at 0.2 and overall novelty at 0.6. 
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Law and Justice (PiS) was also formed shortly before the elections by twin brothers 
Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński. The party was roughly based on Centre Agreement, 
formerly part of AWS, but attracted several conservative splinter groups and drew on 
the popularity of Lech Kaczyński, an independent Minister of Justice in the AWS-led 
government (see Millard, 2003b).  The party had a novel name and was organizationally 
an amalgam of various political groups, some of which had been previously associated 
with AWS, leading to a congruence score of 0.3 (novelty 0.7).  
The Sejm PiS party group was headed by former Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek’s (AWS) 
cabinet chief. However, the Kaczyński brothers were always the key figures in PiS with 
Lech becoming its first formal leader. Even though many of PiS’s leading founders had 
previously been affiliated to AWS, none of them had held a prominent position. Hence, 
leadership congruence was limited (0.25) and novelty high (0.75). 
The League of Polish Families (LPR) was a merger of two radical conservative 
groupings in April 2001. It was joined by a scattering of other parties; some that had 
previously been affiliated to AWS yielded significant influence, such as the Movement 
for Rebuilding Poland (ROP).15 LPR’s first leader was the little known Marek 
Kotlinowski (Polish News Bulletin 2001). Hence, organizationally LPR was slightly 
congruent with AWS and some minor parties16 (0.1 each) and a novelty score of 0.7. 
LPR’s leadership was slightly congruent only with the tiny National-Christian Bloc for 
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Poland (NCBdP),17 but none of its leaders had a background in AWS and ROP’s 
commitment to LPR was debatable.18  
Candidate-wise both PiS and LPR appeared almost perfectly new (Table 5).19 While 
PO’s congruence with UW and AWS was notable, it still had a high degree of candidate 
novelty. Overall, candidate turnover was fairly high – the self-congruence of three 
continuing electons (AWSP, SLD, PSL) was between 0.49 and 0.61. We see a similar 
pattern as noted for Denmark – amongst new and old electons alike, candidate novelty 
is lower at the top and higher in the tails of candidate lists. Congruence increases 
considerably among top 10%-ranking candidates (Table 5, in parentheses) and even 
higher amongst district top candidates (0.28 for both AWS-PO and AWS-LPR).  
Table 5 Poland 1997-2001: Candidate congruence and novelty, top 25% (10%)  
 2001 
1997 AWSP SLD-UP PSL UW PO PiS LPR 
AWS 0.61 (0.85)    0.12 (0.18) 0.08 (0.13) 0.08 (0.16) 
SLD  0.56 (0.75)      
PSL  0 (0.06) 0.49 (0.66)     
UW    0.39 (0.61) 0.11 (0.11)   
ROP       0 (0.05) 
Noveltya 0.36 (0.12) 0.40 (0.20) 0.48 (0.30) 0.60 (0.39) 0.76 (0.68) 0.86 (0.80) 0.87 (0.79) 
Notes: Congurence < 0.05 omitted 
a Includes non-party candidates in 1997 
Source: authors’ calculations based on Popescu and Hannavy, 2001. 
Table 6 compares the congruence and novelty for all electons analysed in this section, 
including those with genuine (LPR) and negligible novelty (IRL). However, several 
electons fall between the extremes, some of them fairly novel (PiS and PO), others 
moderately so (FP and DF) and Kadima right in the middle of the scale.  
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Echoing Barnea and Rahat’s (2011) conclusion, Kadima comes across as a perfect 
example of a partially new party that is clearly congruent with its predecessor but also 
novel to a significant degree. Classifying Kadima either way would be highly 
misleading. Such electons pose common difficulties for measuring party system change 
using electoral volatility, because dichotomous coding of parties as new or old does not 
allow for such partial novelty. In the following section, we propose a new approach to 
electoral volatility employing congruence/novelty scores that allows for partially novel 
electons and deals effectively with splits, mergers and electoral coalitions. 
Table 6 Party congruence and novelty: summary  
  Congruence  
Pair of electons Country Organization Leader Candidates Total Novelty 
IL – IRL Estonia  0.85 0.85 0.39 0.70 0.18 
RP – IRL Estonia  0.85 0.85 0.39 0.70 0.18 
FP – FP Denmark 1.00 0.25 0.78 0.68 0.24 
FP – DF Denmark 0.50 1.00 0.65 0.72 0.28 
Likud – Kadima Israel  0.50 0.50 0.40 0.47 0.47 
AWS – PO = UW – PO Poland 0.20 0.25 0.11 0.19 0.62 
AWS – PiS Poland 0.30 0.25 0.08 0.21 0.77 
AWS – LPR Poland 0.10 0.00 0.08 0.06 0.89 
A new approach to electoral volatility 
The traditional approach to electoral volatility demands all electons to be classified as 
new or successor parties. Coding decisions regarding Kadima-like partially novel 
parties can seriously over- or underestimate electoral volatility. In this section we 
demonstrate how congruence/novelty scores can be used for a more nuanced calculation 
of electoral volatility that takes partial novelty fully into account and allows for linking 
electons to several predecessors or successors. We argue that this approach generates 
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volatility indices that better reflect the substantive extent of party system change. First, 
we outline a split-vote-by-congruence approach for calculating volatility indices. This is 
followed by two empirical illustrations based on elections that saw relatively simple 
cases of a split (Denmark) and a merger (Estonia) with the rest of the party system 
remaining fairly stable.  
Aggregate congruence and novelty between electons A and B are defined and notated as 
follows: 
 Pairwise congruence between electons A and B (CAB) is the mean congruence 
for organization, leaders and candidates. 
 Pairwise novelty of electon B vis-à-vis A is NAB = 1 – CAB 
 Overall novelty of B vis-à-vis all i electons in t-1 is NB = 1 – ΣCAiB 
The approach involves virtual electons – the votes for partially novel electons are split 
into novel and congruent (i.e. precursor) components. For splits, votes are split between 
virtual predecessors (successors for mergers) in proportion to their respective 
congruence. The following hypothetical example explains the method. 
Assume the Amazing Party (A, 50% of votes) splits into two: the Great Party (G, 30%) 
and the Highly Amazing Party (H, 20%). For simplicity, assume that the electoral 
support for the Dull Party (D) is stable at 50% and it lacks any novelty. G has kept 
several high-profile candidates and some local branches of A, but its leader is a political 
newcomer. In contrast, H not only carries a slightly modified name of A but also kept its 
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leader and most of the candidates. The overall congruence between A and G is CAG = 
0.3 and CAH = 0.9. As neither of the new electons has links to D, their novelty is simply 
the inverse of congruence: NG = 0.7 and NH = 0.1. Therefore, 30% · 0.7 = 21% of G’s 
votes are assigned to virtual electon GN (G as Novel) and 30% · 0.3 = 9% to virtual 
electon GA (G as continuation of A). Similarly, the virtual vote share of HN is 20% · 0.1 
= 2% and HA 20% · 0.9 = 18%. 
In t-1, A’s vote is split between the virtual predecessors of G and H proportionally to 
their congruence.20 Vote for A as a predecessor of G is: 
VA
G = VACAG / (CAG + CAH) = 50 % · 0.3 / (0.3 + 0.9) = 12.5%  
and vote for A as a predecessor of H: 
VA
H = VACAH / (CAG + CAH) = 50 % · 0.9 / (0.3 + 0.9) = 37.5% 
A basic yet commonly used approach to volatility calculation is the no-connection 
approach (NC, Table 7),21 based on vote differences disregarding continuity between 
the electons. It produces very different aggregate volatility scores compared to our 
proposed split-vote-by-congruence approach (SBC, Table 8). The assumption of no 
continuity between the electons in the no-connection approach is clearly unreasonable. 
The split-vote-by-congruence approach reduces volatility as G and especially H are 
congruent with A. The high novelty of G and congruence between H and A make the 
biggest contributions to aggregate volatility.  
Table 7 No-connection approach  
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 Vt-1 Vt Change 
A 50 – –50 
G – 30 +30 
H – 20 +20 
D 50 50 0 
 Volatility: 50 
 
Table 8 Split-vote-by-congruence approach 
 Vt-1 Vt Change  
GA 12.5 9.0 –3.5 G as a continuation of A 
GN
 
 21.0 +21.0 G as a novel electon 
HA 37.5 18.0 –19.5 H as continuation of A 
HN  2.0  +2.0 H as a novel electon 
D 50.0 50.0 0.0  
 Volatility: 23  
Not all literature uses the rather blunt no-connection approach. Four alternatives have 
been used that take continuity between electons into account. The most similar party 
approach (MSP) would identify H as the successor of A (V = 30).22 The largest party 
approach (LP) connects a defunct party to its largest successor (Party G, V = 20).23 The 
combined votes approach (CV) adds together the votes of G and H in t-1 (V = 0).
24  
Finally, split-votes-by-support approach (SBS) comes closest to the proposed SBC 
approach, but instead of splitting votes based on similarity, the vote for A in t-1 is split 
according to the electoral support of successors (V = 0).25 CV and SBS are the only 
simple ways to account for multiple successors or predecessors but very clearly 
underestimate volatility. Identifying a single successor can either over- or underestimate 
volatility, depending on whether the protocol favours similarity between the electons 
(MSP) or the largest party (LP). In our example, choosing MSP over LP increases 
volatility by a ratio of 50%. 
22 
 
Choosing a single successor can be even more challenging and have an even bigger 
impact if two equally strong parties created or terminated an ad hoc coalition, a 
significant party experienced a split (Danish example below) or important parties 
merged (Estonian example). Full details on alternative approaches to SBC and a 




Between 1994 and 1998, the Danish Progress Party (FP) experienced a major splinter in 
the form of the Danish People’s Party (DF). We split the FP’s 1994 vote (6.4%) in two, 
between virtual predecessors of DF and stump FP proportionally to congruence (see 
Table 9); the virtual vote share of FP (3.3%) is slightly higher than that of DF (3.1%) 
due to its higher congruence to FP (0.76 vs 0.72). In 1998, the votes for DF (7.4%) and 
FP (2.4%) are split between (a) the electons as successors to FP and (b) the parties as 
novel electons. As the novelty of both electons was rather low (0.28 and 0.24, 
respectively), bulk of their vote (3.2% and 5.3%) is assigned to virtual predecessors.  
Table 9 Volatility in Denmark 1994-8 
 1994 1998 Change 
FP (congruent component) 6.4·0.76 
0.76+0.72
= 3.3 
2.4·0.76 = 3.2 –0.1 





7.4·0.72 = 5.3 +2.2 
FP (novel component)  2.4·0.28 = 0.7 +0.7 
DF (novel component)  7.4·0.24 = 1.8 +1.8 
SD 34.6 35.9 +1.3 
V 23.3 24.0 +0.7 
K 15.0 8.9 –6.1 
SFP 7.3 7.6 +0.3 
CD 2.8 4.3 +1.5 
23 
 
RV 4.6 3.9 –0.7 
EL 3.1 2.7 –0.4 
KFP 1.9 2.5 +0.6 
Other  1.0 0.4 –0.6 
NC, MSP: 11.8 
  SBC: 8.5 
LP, CV, SBS:  7.8 
The resulting aggregate volatility index based on the SBC approach (8.5) is lower than 
the one based on NC and MSP (11.8)27 that code FP as a continuation and DF as a new 
party, hence disregarding important congruence between FP and DF. Identifying DF as 
the largest of FP’s successors, combining vote shares in 1998 or splitting it in 1994 
(approaches LP, CV and SBS respectively) underestimates volatility by overlooking the 
significant weakening of FP (the more congruent successor). The differences in 
volatility scores may look numerically modest but are considerable in relative terms – 
compared to split-vote-by-congruence approach, SBC, NC and MSP overestimate 
volatility by 39% and the other approaches underestimate it by 8%. Even more 
substantial differences can occur in countries with less stable party systems in CEE and 
in some long-standing democracies that have experienced more party change. 
Before considering the Estonian example, we need to introduce further virtual electons 
to be used with mergers. When X and Y merge to form a new electon Z, the vote share 
VX
IZ of incongruent component in t-1 is: 
VX
IZ = V · X · (1–CXZ). 
24 
 
The vote share of Z in t-1 is split proportionally according to the relative congruence of 
the constituent parts (following the principle of virtual predecessors used with splits) to 
obtain the vote shares of virtual successor electons:  
VZ
X = VZ · (1–NZ) · CXZ / (CXZ+CYZ), 
where VZ
X stands for vote share of Z as a successor to X.  
In Estonia 2003-7, the SBC approach produces very different volatility scores compared 
to traditional strategies (see Table 10). The NC approach vastly overestimates volatility 
by ignoring significant congruence between IRL and its constituent parts. Approaches 
LP (RP as the largest predecessor), CV and SBS underestimate volatility by overlooking 
IRL’s mild but significant novelty. Picking IL instead of RP as IRL’s sole predecessor 
(MSP if focussing on IRL’s name or prioritising the more established party) would 
depend on investigator’s taste (or at least the rule would be difficult to standardize), yet 




Table 10 Volatility in Estonia 2003-7 
 2003 2007 Change 
RP 24.6   
IL 7.3   
IRL  17.9  
RPI-IRL (incongruent component) VRP
I-IRL = 7.4  –7.4 
ILI-IRL (incongruent component) VIL
I-IRL = 2.2  –2.2 
RPIRL (congruent component) VRP
P-IRL = 17.2 VIRL
S-RP = 6.5 –10.7 
ILIRL (congruent component) VIL
P-IRL = 5.1 VIRL
S-IL = 6.5 +1.4 
IRLN
 (novel component)  VIRL
N = 5.0 +5.0 
RE 17.7 27.8 +10.1 
KE  25.4 26.1 +0.7 
SDE 7.0 10.6 +3.6 
EER   7.1 +7.1 
RL  13.0 7.1 –5.9 




LP, CV, SBS:  21.5 
Note: Detailed calculations in supplementary materials. 
LP, CV and SBS emphasize the decrease in the support of IRL compared to its 
predecessors. However, the incentives behind the merger were very different for RP and 
IL. RP wanted to halt its collapse; IL – whose support was increasing – to benefit from 
RP’s better organization, attractive candidates and a better seats/votes ratio for bigger 
parties under modified d’Hondt. The two were essentially equal partners and IRL’s vote 
share was a downturn for RP (though not as bad as it would have suffered on its own) 
but a mild improvement for IL. Here, SBS suffers from a further peculiar shortcoming – 
it is based on previous election’s votes, but party support can fluctuate greatly between 
elections. Before the merger, IL’s support in opinion polls was three times higher than 




In this article, we propose a new multi-dimensional concept of party novelty. The 
concept and the accompanying interval measure of party congruence/novelty allows for 
partial novelty and is not only useful for understanding the extent of change within 
individual parties, but also forms the basis for a split-vote-by-congruence approach to 
calculating volatility. Four case studies of party change and two illustrations of the new 
approach were used to test their validity. The novelty index chimes with our assessment 
of the cases based on in-depth knowledge; the proposed approach to volatility leads to 
meaningful and improved indices. Most importantly, the split-vote-by-congruence 
approach eliminates the need for dichotomous and potentially contentious coding of 
parties (as new, or singular successors/predecessors) that often leads to significantly 
over- or underestimated volatility. The examples served to showcase the advantages of 
the approach, although the advantages are more significant in more complex situation.  
An obvious challenge for the congruence/novelty index is that in order to be reliable, it 
requires more information on individual electons than traditional approaches.28 In the 
cases analysed here, leadership congruence was easy to determine based on online 
sources (even for the older Danish election); if little information is available about a 
new leader, novelty can be assumed. Assessing organizational congruence can be more 
difficult as information on party organization can be rather limited and fragmented, 
especially when electoral politics revolves around complex coalitions. However, rough 
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levels of congruence/novelty are easy to estimate for major parties and, in any case, this 
is also necessary for classifying parties meaningfully as new or old.  
Calculating candidate congruence can be time-consuming, especially in larger countries 
or where data is unavailable in a convenient format. However, candidate data are 
increasingly available online. To our knowledge, extensive time series data are being 
collated for several West European countries; we have collated a candidate data set for 
nearly all elections in CEE since 1990s and are developing a computer code for 
automatically linking candidates between elections and calculating split-vote-by-
congruence volatility. When candidate data are not available, MP turnover could be 
used as a proxy for dealing with continuing parties. More generally, where data is 
lacking, the split-vote-by-congruence approach can be used with rough estimates of 
congruence/novelty. The approach is computationally slightly more complex and time-
consuming than traditional approaches to volatility. However, the complexity pales 
compared to the mathematics behind even the most basic regression methods widely 
used in political research.  
More fundamentally, our approach involving virtual electons problematizes whether a 
party is a proper unit of analysis for calculating volatility or analysing party system 
dynamics. Our approach could even provide a better approximation of perceived voter-
level volatility (i.e. do voters believe or feel that they have changed their preferences) 
that was perhaps the main original aim of electoral volatility index. Firstly, a ‘party’ is 
28 
 
only one possible type of electons, which can be completely absent in some 
parliamentary elections (e.g. Latvia 2010). Secondly, party transformation is sometimes 
highly complex, involving several parties and various degrees of novelty, often in 
conjunction. The split-vote-by-congruence approach can explicitly account for such 
complexities. The extra effort required is richly compensated by eliminating the need to 
justify often contentious or even impossible dichotomous coding. 
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 Not successors to existing parliamentary parties, have a novel name and structure, and do not have any 
important figures from democratic politics among their prominent member (Sikk, 2005). 
2
 Our approach could also detect continuations among small parties for which candidate data but little 
other information might be available. Often grouped together as “other”, they can reduce the reliability of 
volatility indices (see Casal Bértoa et al, 2015)  
3
 See Bartolini and Mair, 2007; Emanuele and Chiaramonte, 2016; Hug, 2001; Lago and Martínez, 2011; 
Mainwaring et al, 2009; Mainwaring and Zoco, 2007; Mair, 1993; Powell and Tucker, 2014; Sikk, 2005; 
Tavits, 2008a, 2008b. 
4
 Coalition patterns and MP/ministerial turnover also reflect party change (Barnea and Rahat, 2011; 
Gherghina, 2015), but their value is more limited as they do not apply to (a) non-governing parties and (b) 
electons that did not enter the parliament twice. MPs and ministers are problematic if their number per 
party is small – congruence can fluctuate greatly if only one seat is lost or retained. 
5
 An organizationally stable party with a highly novel name would be highly self-congruent (0.75).  
6
 We contrast top-ranking candidates to full candidate lists in the preceding election. This asymmetry is 
intentional. Top-ranking candidates take elections more seriously and are more important for political 
parties. However, we are interested in being a candidate in previous election, rather than being a top-
ranking candidates. Top candidates are less likely to be new than former top candidates to leave politics 
(due to retirement, intra-party term limits etc.). Turnover by choice is a better indicator of novelty than 
turnover by necessity.  
7
 Candidate importance is more difficult to determine under single mandate districts; we suggest looking 
at all candidates weighted by vote shares. More research is needed to operationalise congruence and 
scrutinize the index under different electoral systems. 
8
 Top 25% of candidates on nationwide lists in 2006 compared to full lists in 2003. 
9
 Lower than Social Democrats (75%) and Liberals (57%) (data: Indenrigsministeriet, 1999). 
10
 Rankings based on the combination of personal votes and proportionally distributed list votes (see 
Elklit, 2005); 1-4 candidates per district based on magnitude.  
11
 The merger was hastily completed before the election as the Estonian electoral law only allowed 






 Top 31 candidates on nationwide lists (data: Estonian National Electoral Committee, www.vvk.ee). 
13
 For details see Szczerbiak, 2002; Millard, 2003b. 
14
 Established as a coalition and registered as a party after the election. 
15
 Such as the Polish Agreement (PP), the Catholic-National Movement (RKN) and the Alliance for 
Poland (PdP). See Polish News Bulletin, 2001; de Lange and Guerra, 2009. 
16
 ROP and BdP. 
17
 0.2, Roman Giertych, its former candidate, was a notable figure in the alliance. 
18
 ROP, led by the former Prime Minister Jan Olszewski, was the last to join and first to leave LPR after 
the election (Millard 2003a). 
19
 Top 25% of candidates in 19 districts based on preference votes compared to 1997 Sejm and Senate 
lists; some non-affiliated 1997 Senate candidates considered new in 2001. Data from Popescu & 
Hannavy, 2001. 
20
 Pairwise congruences sometimes do not add up to one – e.g. when after a split the leaders of successors 
were all prominent politicians in the parent party. Therefore, the congruence is adjusted using total 
congruence in the following formulas. 
21
 Used, for example by Birch 2003; Powell & Tucker, 2014 
22
 The difference between NC and MSP is sometimes vague, NC tends to focus on party names, MSP 
allows for more changes. 
23
 Similar to ‘largest-successor method’ (Casal Bértoa et al, 2015), the more general term also applies for 
predecessors. 
24
 This approach (also ‘aggregation method’, Casal Bértoa et al, 2015) has been extensively used 
(Bartolini and Mair, 1990, Bielasiak, 2002, Chiaramonte and Emanuele, 2017, Dassonneville and 
Hooghe, 2015, Lane and Ersson, 2007; Sikk, 2005). 
25
 Used in Sikk 2005 for complex electoral coalitions. 
26
 In principle, novelty and congruence should be calculated for all electons. This is not done here to keep 
the examples simple; distinction between stable and changing electons was also very clear. 
27
 Score in Dassonneville and Hooghe, 2015; Núñez et al, 2016. 
28
 The aggregation of three dimensions would iron out minor errors. More work is needed on the 
relationship between the dimensions and possible weighting to best capture substantive party change. 
Supplementary materials for “Party Congruence and Novelty: A New 
Approach to Measuring Party Change and Volatility” 
Dimensions of party change 
We propose an index of aggregate electon congruence, ranging from 0 (perfect incongruence) 
to 1 (perfect congruence), based on three dimensions: (a) organization including name, (b) 
leadership, and (c) candidates. Benchmark scores and descriptions for each dimension are 
given below. Note that it is not only possible for electons to take any intermediate score 
within each dimension – equally, any combination of scores on the three dimensions is 
empirically possible. Although some of these combinations may only be rarely observed, no 
value on any dimension logically precludes a score on another – i.e. it is possible for an 
electon to exhibit high candidate continuation despite choosing an outsider as a leader. 
Organization 
This dimension refers to all organizational units of an electon such as local, regional and 
national branches as well as official factions, sub-groupings or significant special interest 
groups including youth organizations. In addition, yet less importantly, this dimension refers 
to the name of an electon as it appears on the ballot paper. In case of ad hoc coalitions, parties 
often retain their official name in national registers, yet compete under a different name and 
even established parties occasionally innovate to highlight particular aspects of their 
programme or their leading candidate (see e.g. the change of the Austrian People’s Party 
(ÖVP) to “ÖVP – Liste Sebastian Kurz” in the 2017 parliamentary election). 
We propose the following congruence benchmarks for organizational congruence 
(intermediate scores can be used to reflect specific circumstances): 
 1.0: an electon is congruent to itself in the previous election as it retains the name and 
electoral organization; 
 0.75: minor changes to name or electoral organization, or cosmetic changes to both; 
 0.5: substantial changes to name, organization or coalitional changes, including 
mergers. A merger of two similarly sized electons is a benchmark with a congruence 
score of 0.5 for both; 
 0.25: an electon which was absent from one or two previous elections but retains the 
name of a previously existing electon; 
 0: an electon that is completely new with no identifiable precursors in terms of 
organization and name. 
Leader 
This dimension refers to the highest-ranking and formally most powerful representative of an 
electon, irrespective of formal title. In case of collective leadership, overall congruence is 
calculated as the average of individual leaders’ congruence scores. 
The congruence scores benchmarks for leadership are: 
 1.0: an electon retains the leader from previous election; 
 0.75: the new leader was previously a deputy leader, held a major political office for 
the party, has been the party leader before, or led an important internal faction; 
 0.5: the old leader stepped down for obvious non-political reasons (e.g. death or 
illness) or the new leader has held an important political office as an independent; 
 0.25: the new party leader previously held a low profile, but has been associated with 
political parties before; 
 0.0: the new party leader is recruited from outside of the political elite. 
Candidates 
 
This dimension refers to individuals contesting an election under an electon’s name, i.e. they 
appear on its candidate list(s) or are the electon’s official candidate in a single-member 
districts (i.e. not merely endorsed by it). Thereby, candidates do not need to be members of 
the electon in question (and can hold membership in other electons); candidates that are 
members of an electon but contest elections as independents are not considered. 
 
Candidate congruence is equal to the share of an electon’s candidates at time t that contested 
the election at t-1. 
 If all candidates of an electon contested previous elections with the same electon, it is 
perfectly self-congruent. If none of the candidates contested the previous election, the 
electon is perfectly novel. 
 If the candidates come from several previous electons, the pairwise congruence 
depends on the share of candidates who previously ran on each list. 
We suggest contrasting top-ranking candidates to full candidate lists in the previous election.  
Top-ranking candidates have a higher importance for political parties, have higher chances of 
getting elected and are more likely to have previously run for office (hence the comparison 
with full candidates lists from the previous election). Furthermore, candidates with no 
electoral prospects are more likely to leave politics, resulting in high levels of candidate 
turnover; however, this is of little importance to the substantive degree of electon continuity. 
What constitutes top-ranking candidates depends on the electoral system. We suggest using 
the top 25% (relative to assembly size or district magnitude, respectively) based on list 







Volatility calculations (other approaches than SBC) 
Denmark 
No-connection (NC) and most similar party approach (MSP), Denmark 1994-8 
 1994 1998 Change 
FP 6.4 2.4 –4.0 
DF – 7.4 +7.4 
SD 34.6 35.9 +1.3 
V 23.3 24.0 +0.7 
K 15.0 8.9 –6.1 
SFP 7.3 7.6 +0.3 
CD 2.8 4.3 +1.5 
RV 4.6 3.9 –0.7 
EL 3.1 2.7 –0.4 
KFP 1.9 2.5 +0.6 
Other  1.0 0.4 –0.6 
Total volatility: 11.8 
Largest party approach (LP) Denmark 1994-8 
 1994 1998 Change 
FP  DF 6.4 7.4 +1.0 
stump FP – 2.4 +2.4 
SD 34.6 35.9 +1.3 
V 23.3 24.0 +0.7 
K 15.0 8.9 –6.1 
SFP 7.3 7.6 +0.3 
CD 2.8 4.3 +1.5 
RV 4.6 3.9 –0.7 
EL 3.1 2.7 –0.4 
KFP 1.9 2.5 +0.6 
Other  1.0 0.4 –0.6 
Total volatility: 7.8 
Combined vote approach (CV) Denmark 1994-8 
 1994 1998 Change 
FP  DF+FP 6.4 7.4 + 2.4 = 9.8 +3.4 
SD 34.6 35.9 +1.3 
V 23.3 24.0 +0.7 
K 15.0 8.9 –6.1 
SFP 7.3 7.6 +0.3 
CD 2.8 4.3 +1.5 
RV 4.6 3.9 –0.7 
EL 3.1 2.7 –0.4 
KFP 1.9 2.5 +0.6 
Other  1.0 0.4 –0.6 
Total volatility: 7.8 
Split-by-support approach (SBS), Denmark 1994-8 
 1994 1998 Change 
DF (76% of combined vote in 1998) 6.4 * 76% = 4.9 7.4 +2.5 
FP (24% of combined vote in 1998) 6.4 * 24% = 1.5 2.4 +0.9 
SD 34.6 35.9 +1.3 
V 23.3 24.0 +0.7 
K 15.0 8.9 –6.1 
SFP 7.3 7.6 +0.3 
CD 2.8 4.3 +1.5 
RV 4.6 3.9 –0.7 
EL 3.1 2.7 –0.4 
KFP 1.9 2.5 +0.6 
Other  1.0 0.4 –0.6 
Total volatility:  7.8 
 
Estonia 
No-connection approach (NC) Estonia 2003-7 
 2003 2007 Change 
RP 24.6  –24.6 
IL 7.3  –7.3 
IRL  17.9 +17.9 
RE 17.7 27.8 +10.1 
KE  25.4 26.1 +0.7 
SDE 7.0 10.6 +3.6 
EER   7.1 +7.1 
RL  13.0 7.1 –5.9 
Others  4.8 3.3 –1.5 
Total volatility: 39.4 
 
Most similar party approach (MSP) Estonia 2003-7 
 2003 2007 Change 
RP 24.6  –24.6 
IL  IRL 7.3 17.9 +10.6 
RE 17.7 27.8 +10.1 
KE  25.4 26.1 +0.7 
SDE 7.0 10.6 +3.6 
EER   7.1 +7.1 
RL  13.0 7.1 –5.9 
Others  4.8 3.3 –1.5 
Total volatility: 32.0 
Largest party approach (LP) Estonia 2003-7 
 2003 2007 Change 
RP  IRL 24.6 17.9 –6.7 
IL 7.3  –7.3 
RE 17.7 27.8 +10.1 
KE  25.4 26.1 +0.7 
SDE 7.0 10.6 +3.6 
EER   7.1 +7.1 
RL  13.0 7.1 –5.9 
Others  4.8 3.3 –1.5 
Total volatility: 21.5 
Combined vote approach (CV) Estonia 2003-7 
 2003 2007 Change 




RE 17.7 27.8 +10.1 
KE  25.4 26.1 +0.7 
SDE 7.0 10.6 +3.6 
EER   7.1 +7.1 
RL  13.0 7.1 –5.9 
Others  4.8 3.3 –1.5 
Total volatility: 21.5 
Split-by-support approach (SBS) Estonia 2003-7 
 2003 2007 Change 
RP (77% of combined vote in 2007) 
24.6 
17.9 * 77% = 
13.8 
–10.8 
IL (23% of combined vote in 2007) 
7.3 
17.9 * 23% = 
4.1 
–3.2 
RE 17.7 27.8 +10.1 
KE  25.4 26.1 +0.7 
SDE 7.0 10.6 +3.6 
EER   7.1 +7.1 
RL  13.0 7.1 –5.9 
Others  4.8 3.3 –1.5 
Total volatility: 21.5 
 
Steps in split-by-congruence (SBC) volatility calculation, RP, IL and IRL (Estonia 2003-2007) 
 
 
